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Abstract
We examine problems of “intermediated implementation,” in which a single
principal can only regulate limited aspects of the consumption bundles traded
between intermediaries and agents with hidden characteristics. An example
is sales, whereby retailers compete through offering consumption bundles to
customers with hidden tastes, whereas a manufacturer with a potentially dif-
ferent goal than retailers’ is limited to regulating the sold goods but not the
charged prices by legal barriers. We study how the principal can implement
through intermediaries any social choice rule that is incentive compatible and
individually rational for agents. We demonstrate the effectiveness of per-unit
fee schedule and distribution regulation, which hinges on whether intermedi-
aries have private or interdependent values. We give further applications to
healthcare regulation and income redistribution.
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1 Introduction
We examine problems of “intermediated implementation,” which involve a principal,
one or multiple intermediaries and a continuum of agents with hidden characteristics.
Intermediaries offer menus of multifaceted consumption bundles to agents, whereas
the principal with a potentially different goal than intermediaries’ is limited to regu-
lating sub-aspects of the sold bundles by practical barriers.
Problems that fit the above description abound. An example is car sales, in which
dealers trade car-price bundles to customers with hidden tastes. A manufacturer, say,
Mercedes-Benz, cares both sales profit and brand building but has only partial control
over the sold bundles. On the one hand, the manufacturer dictates the car supply
and actively tracks the sold cars through the unique vehicle identification numbers
(VIN) they are associated with. On the other hand, she cannot regulate the charged
prices explicitly or implicitly, which is ruled illegal by the Sherman’s Act’s ban on
vertical price fixing.1
In this paper, we take the barriers faced by the principal as given and examine
how she can implement through intermediaries any target social choice rule that
is incentive compatible and individually rational for agents. We focus mainly on
quasi-linear environments and competitive intermediaries and relax these assumptions
in later sections. Our solutions exploit the varying characterizations of incentive
compatible allocations rather than their exact forms.
Specifically, we analyze a stylized game in which competitive intermediaries offer
menus of consumption good-price bundles to agents, taking the principal’s partial
regulation of sold consumption goods as given. A sub-game perfect equilibrium in-
duced by the principal’s policy achieves intermediated implementation if all agents
obtain target consumption bundles and all intermediaries break even on the equilib-
rium path. We mainly concern what policies achieve intermediated implementation
in every sub-game perfect equilibrium, and under what conditions.
We consider two kinds of policies: per-unit fee schedules and distribution regula-
tions. They are the weakest and strongest among consumption regulations, and they
are commonly used in practice. Their effectiveness hinges on whether intermediaries
have interdependent or private values or more specifically, whether intermediaries’
1In 1980, the Sherman Act’s complete ban of vertical price fixing became effective again, and
retail price maintenance has been illegal in the U.S. since then. By law, it is illegal to influence the
dealers’ pricing strategies or to force disclosure of their charged prices or earned profits.
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payoffs depend directly on agents’ hidden characteristics or not. In the case of pri-
vate values, intermediated implementation can be achieved through a per-unit fee
schedule that allows intermediaries to break even under the target social choice rule.
With interdependent values, per-unit fee schedules cannot generally be used to achieve
intermediated implementation, whereas regulating the distribution of sold goods can
in general environments.
To illustrate, suppose, in the leading example, 20 percent of the customers have
high tastes for cars and 80 percent have low tastes for cars. Dealers have interdepen-
dent values if sales profit depends directly on customers’ hidden tastes–e.g., low-taste
customers drive aggressively and incur high repair costs under warranty–and they
have private values otherwise. The manufacturer produces high- and low-quality cars
and adopt two kinds of policies in practice: (1) invoice-price schedules that charge
distinct per-unit fees for different models of sold cars, and (2) quota schemes man-
dating that dealers sell a certain variety of cars. By actively tracking the unique VIN
number associated with each car and monitoring dealers’ inventories, the manufac-
turer can suspend car deliveries until sales records are deemed satisfactory.2 A recent
quote from a salesman at a Benz dealership in the Bay Area goes: “We still have
2018 CLA-class left and they must go, otherwise the mixture doesn’t look right and
Benz won’t deliver us any C-lass cars.”
In the case of private values, charging intermediaries the target level of profit from
serving each car achieves intermediated implementation. From private values, it fol-
lows that a car makes profit if and only if it is sold above the target level of price.
Meanwhile, incentive compatibility implies that each customer prefers his target bun-
dle to that of other customers, let along bundles that are profitable to dealers. Thus,
the competition between dealers drives profit to zero and sustains the target car-price
rule in an equilibrium. Furthermore, all equilibria are payoff equivalent for customers
and dealers, and outcome equivalence is ensured if no customer is indifferent between
his bundle and any other customer’s under the target car-price rule.
With interdependent values, invoice-price schedules do not generally work for
similar reasons to that given by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976). Instead, consider a
quota scheme mandating that among the cars sold by each dealer, 20 percent must
be of high quality and 80 percent must be of low quality. In order to meet this
2See, e.g., https://www.investopedia.com/terms/d/dealer-incentive.asp, for additional examples
of dealer incentives.
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requirement, the only way that dealers can deviate from serving target-quality cars
to customers is to sell high-quality cars to low-taste customers and low-quality cars to
high-taste customers. However, since this permuted consumption rule is decreasing in
customer’s taste, it cannot be part of any incentive compatible allocation and hence
cannot arise as a result of dealers’ profitable deviations. Thus in equilibrium, dealers
offer target-quality cars to customers, and competition drives prices to target levels.
The above findings generalize to environments where agents have quasi-linear
utilities and multi-dimensional hidden characteristics. There distribution regulation
achieves intermediated implementation in every sub-game perfect equilibrium if and
only if permuting target consumption goods yields a distinct total utility of consump-
tion among agents—a condition we term as (DU). In single-dimensional environments,
(DU) is automatically satisfied if agent utilities satisfy the single-crossing property. In
multi-dimensional environments, the profiles of agent utilities ruled out by (DU) are
negligible compared to those that can be attained by incentive compatible allocations.
We give two more applications of our results. We first examine how, under market-
based healthcare systems, the government can achieve the target insurance provision
through partial regulations of sold insurance policies. This application features in-
terdependent values, as the profit earned by private companies from insurance sales
depends directly on the patient’s risk type. When patients have CARA utilities,
per-unit coverage-plan subsidies cannot generally achieve the government’s target,
whereas regulating the variety of sold coverage plans can. This finding justifies the
rulings introduced by the Affordable Care Act to battle cream skimming, which man-
date that all participating companies in the health insurance exchange sell the target
variety of coverage plans, and penalize companies for selling too many low-coverage
plans (Folger (2013); Cox et al. (2016)).
We next examine what wage regulations achieve the target income redistribution
among workers with hidden abilities, while allowing firms to specify and monitor
employee performances based on hard-to-verify or even subjective information (Levin
(2003)). We find that the distinction between private and interdependent values
hinges on whether effective labor outputs or labor hours are contractible. Mirrlees’
income tax schedule remains effective in the first case, but must be combined with
policies that enforce the target wage distribution among workers in the second case.
The second policy resembles the employment target faced by federal employers, which
mandates that a certain percentage of their low-wage positions be filled with people
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with self-reported disabilities.
1.1 Related Literature
Incentive compatibility Our analysis leverages different characterizations of in-
centive compatible allocations. In the case of private values, the per-unit fee schedule
described in Theorem 1 serves dual roles. First, it allows intermediaries to break
even under the target social choice rule and transforms the latter into the production
frontier. In this augmented economy, incentive compatibility implies that each agent
most prefers his target bundle on the production frontier, hence the target social
choice rule is Pareto efficient and can be attained by the Bertrand competition be-
tween intermediaries. Fagart (1996) and Pouyet et al. (2008) examine the efficiency
properties of laissez-faire economies where the payoffs of competitive firms are inde-
pendent of consumers’ hidden characteristics. We instead devise policy interventions
that implement any IC-IR social choice rule through intermediaries.
The result on interdependent values exploits Rochet (1987)’s characterization of
implementable consumption rules by cyclic monotonicity. Rochet (1987) examines
screening problems between an agent with quasi-linear utility and multi-dimensional
hidden characteristics. In our setting, distribution regulation achieves intermediated
implementation if and only if every permutation of the target consumption rule is
not implementable. Applying cyclic monotonicity twice along the permutation cycle
yields the key condition (DU), namely permutation yields a distinct total utility of
consumption among agents.
Adverse selection Since Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976), economists have long rec-
ognized that interdependent values, or adverse selection, may lead to equilibrium non-
existence or inefficiency in competitive environments. Various methods to tackle this
challenge have been developed, which include but are not limited to: Prescott and Townsend
(1984), Gale (1992), Dubey and Geanakoplos (2002), Bisin and Gottardi (2006) and
Azevedo and Gottlieb (2017), which examine Walrasian equilibria where everyone
takes as given the price and composition of traders for all potential contracts; Miyazaki
(1977), Wilson (1977) and Riley (1979), which develop solution concepts that al-
low players to anticipate other people’s reactions to their contractual offers;3 and
3Hellwig (1987) first provides game-thereotic foundations for these solution concepts. See
Netzer and Scheuer (2014) and the references therein for subsequent developments. Among other
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Inderst and Wambach (2001) and Guerrieri et al. (2010), which use capacity con-
straints to restore equilibrium existence.4
Our work differs from the above ones in several aspects. First, we implement
any IC-IR social choice rule, which differs generally from the equilibrium outcomes of
laissez-faire economies. An example is given in Section 3.2.1, where agents’ incentive
constraints bind differently than in the separating equilibria of Rothschild and Stiglitz
(1976), Miyazaki (1977) or Wilson (1977).
Second, compared to most above studies, our intermediaries have more room to
strategize, as they can specify all facets of the consumption bundle and face no limit on
the menu size. Absent the principal, these features, together with the standard game-
theoretic solution concept we adopt, tend to make it harder, not easier to establish
equilibrium existence. In sum, our problem, game and solution concept differ, and so
do our results.
Third, some of the above studies obtain equilibrium uniqueness through refine-
ments, whereas we give sufficient and necessary conditions for outcome equivalence
based on primitives. Any equilibrium refinement, if performed, will further weaken
these conditions, which are already weak ones in our views.
Stantcheva (2014) investigates the scope of redistribution when the employment
contracts signed between firms and workers can only be partially regulated. The
author focuses on the interdependent-value case, does not seek to implement any
IC-IR rule, adopts Miyazaki’s (1977) solution concept and examines different policy
interventions than distribution regulation.
Competing mechanism For the most part, we limit intermediaries to offering
menus of consumption bundles in order to facilitate comparison between existing (ap-
plied) studies on exclusive competition. In Section 5, we touch on the issue of compet-
ing mechanism. Competing mechanisms between multiple principals and agents have
been studied by Epstein and Peters (1999), Yamashita (2010) and Peters and Szentes
(2012) among others. Peters (2014) gives a literature review.
things, these studies introduce additional economic mechanisms (e.g., withdraw, renegotiation) into
the original game of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976)—a trick we do not use here.
4Attar et al. (2011) demonstrates the usefulness of latent contracts for deterring cream-skimming
deviations when competition is nonexclusive. Here competition is exclusive.
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Hierarchy and regulation As in most existing studies on hierarchy surveyd by
Mookherjee (2013), we take as given the practical barriers that prevent the principal
from fully controlling the bundles traded between intermediaries and agents. Our
innovation is to tackle the implementation frictions that arise from conflicting interests
and are exacerbated by the adverse selection and monopolistic screening between
intermediaries and agents. Our results can be applied to the regulations of vertical
relationships that entail the above described frictions. To our best knowledge, our
addition is new to the regulation literature, which is surveyed by Laffont and Tirole
(1993) and Armstrong and Sappington (2016) among others.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 describes the model;
Section 3 conducts analyses; Section 4 gives applications; Section 5 concludes. Omit-
ted proofs and materials can be found in the appendix.
2 Model
This section is organized as follows: Section 2.1 introduces the model setup; Section
2.2 defines candidate policies; Section 2.3 illustrates the model in the leading example.
2.1 Setup
Primitives There is a principal, finite I intermediaries and a unit mass of in-
finitesimal agents. Agents’ hidden characteristics, denoted by θ, are drawn from
a finite set Θ according to a probability mass function Pθ. A consumption bun-
dle (x, y) is a pair of consumption good x and price y in a compact and connected
set X × Y ⊂ Rd × R. Agents have single-unit demand for bundles and for now,
quasi-linear utilities u (x, y, θ) = v (x, θ) − y. A constant-returns-to-scale technology
yields a profit π (x, y, θ) from serving bundle (x, y) to type θ agents. The functions
u : X × Y × Θ → R and π : X × Y × Θ → R are continuous, and the function π is
increasing in y. Let 0 denote the null bundle that yields zero reservation utilities to
inactive players. Assume without loss of generality that 0 ∈ X × Y .
Target social choice rule Consider, for now, the benchmark case where the prin-
cipal owns intermediaries and the technology for serving agents. The principal’s goal
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is to implement a target social choice rule (xˆ, yˆ) : X×Y → Θ, which must be incentive
compatible and individually rational for agents, i.e., for all θ,
u (xˆ (θ) , yˆ (θ) , θ) ≥ u (xˆ (θ′) , yˆ (θ′) , θ) ∀θ′, (ICθ)
and
u (xˆ (θ) , yˆ (θ) , θ) ≥ 0. (IRθ)
In what follows, we fix any such rule and focus on its implementation. We do not
reason about what makes (xˆ, yˆ) a desirable rule, because doing so requires that we
specify the exact form of the principal’s objective function, which we modelers refrain
from making judgment about. Exceptions appear in Sections 2.3 and 4, where we give
examples of target social choice rules as solutions of concrete optimization problems.
In the benchmark case, the implementation of the target social choice rule is
standard: the principal can simply offer the menu of target consumption bundles
{(xˆ (θ) , yˆ (θ)) : θ ∈ Θ} to agents and let them self-select; intermediaries passively
serve the selected bundles to agents and surrender profits to the principal.
Intermediated implementation Now suppose, instead, the technology for serv-
ing agents is owned by intermediaries, whereas the principal is limited to regulating
the x-dimension of the sold bundles by practical barriers such as the ones described
in Section 1. In what follows, we take these barriers as given and examine when and
how the principal can implement the target social choice rule. The problem is the
most interesting when the target social choice rule does not maximize intermediaries’
profits.
We focus on the case of competitive intermediaries I ≥ 2 and relegate the case of
monopolistic intermediary I = 1 to Appendix C. For each i = 1, · · · , I, let µi denote
the measure on X×Y ×Θ that is induced by intermediary i’s sold bundles, and let νi
be the measure on X that is induced by µi. A policy ψ : ∆(X)→ R maps measures
on sold goods to the reals. Based on νi, the principal charges intermediary i a fee
ψ (νi), leaving the latter with the following net profit:
∫
(x,y,θ)
π (x, y, θ) dµi − ψ (νi) . (2.1)
Time evolves as follows:
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1. the principal commits to a policy ψ : ∆ (X)→ R;
2. intermediaries simultaneously propose menus of deterministic consumption bun-
dles to agents, i.e., σi ∈ 2
X×Y , i = 1, · · · , I;5
3. each agent selects a bundle from ∪iσi ∪ {0};
4. intermediaries pay fees to the principal.
Our solution concept is sub-game perfect equilibrium, or equilibrium for short.
Below is our notion of implementation:
Definition 1. A sub-game perfect equilibrium induced by a policy ψ achieves in-
termediated implementation if all agents obtain target consumption bundles and all
intermediaries break even on the equilibrium path.
We will present results on both partial and full implementations.
Notations Let xˆ (Θ), yˆ (Θ) and (xˆ, yˆ) (Θ) denote the images of Θ under the map-
pings xˆ, yˆ and (xˆ, yˆ), respectively. For each x ∈ xˆ (Θ), let yˆ (x) be the unique y ∈ yˆ (Θ)
such that (x, y) ∈ (xˆ, yˆ) (Θ),6 and let
πˆ (x) = Eθ [π (x, yˆ (x) , θ) | (xˆ, yˆ) (θ) = (x, yˆ (x))] (2.2)
be the expected profit from serving bundle (x, yˆ (x)) to its target agents. Assume for
regularity that min
y∈Y
π (x, y) < πˆ (x) for all x ∈ X .
Main assumptions Our agents have quasi-linear utilities and finite types, and our
intermediaries can offer menus of consumption bundles to agents. We relax these
assumptions in Sections 4.1 and 5.
2.2 Candidate Policies
Our candidate policies are: per-unit fee schedules and distribution regulations. For
every sold bundle (x, y), a per-unit fee schedule, written as ψper−unit, charges a fee
5If intermediaries can offer lotteries of consumption goods to agents, then let the principal regulate
these lotteries, i.e., ψ : ∆ (∆ (X))→ R, and all results will remain valid.
6Uniqueness is easy to establish: if there exist y, y′ ∈ yˆ (Θ) such that y < y′ and (x, y) , (x, y′) ∈
(xˆ, yˆ) (Θ), then all agents would prefer (x, y) to (x, y′) and hence (x, y′) /∈ (xˆ, yˆ) (Θ), a contradiction.
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t (x) if x ∈ xˆ (Θ), or a big penalty denoted by “+∞” if x /∈ xˆ(Θ). In the leading
example of car sales, the principal controls the product supply, hence the penalty
term is never invoked.
Much attention will be given to the per-unit fee schedule ψˆper−unit, which charges
the profit from serving every consumption good to its target agents at the target level
of price, i.e., t (x) = πˆ (x) for every x ∈ xˆ (Θ). The total charge to intermediary i,
which is additively separable across bundles, is
ψˆper−unit (νi) =
∫
x∈xˆ(Θ)
πˆ (x) dνi (2.3)
Contrary to per-unit fee schedules, distribution regulations impose aggregate-level
restrictions on sold consumption goods. Much attention will be given to the following
policy ψˆdistr, which implements the per-unit fee schedule ψˆper−unit if the bundles sold
by intermediary i match the probability measure Pˆx on X induced by the target social
choice rule, and charges a big penalty otherwise, i.e.,
ψˆdistr (νi) =


ψˆper−unit (νi) if
νi∫
x∈xˆ(Θ) dνi
= Pˆx,
+∞ otherwise.
(2.4)
Our principal can use big penalties to deter detectable deviations. In practice,
this is case if the principal can impose credible threats on intermediaries through
suspending product supplies as in the leading example, or if she presents the legal
authority as in the applications of Section 4. Then among all consumption regulations,
ψˆper−unit is the weakest policy because (1) even in the case of direct implementation,
the principal would charge the exact same per-unit fee πˆ (x) for every sold x ∈ xˆ (Θ);
(2) intermediaries pay exactly ψˆper−unit in any equilibrium that achieves intermediated
implementation through any consumption regulation. By contrast, ψˆdistr deters all
detectable deviations that intermediaries can possibly commit and thus constitutes
the strongest kind of the policies of our interest.
2.3 Leading Example
In the leading example of car sales, suppose each customer has a single-unit demand
for cars. His taste, denoted by θ, is private information, and his reservation utility
is normalized to zero. A consumption bundle (x, y) is a pair of car model x ∈ X =
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{C-class,E-class, . . .} and price y ∈ Y ⊂ R. It yields a utility u (x, y, θ) = v (x, θ)− y
to type θ customers and a sales profit π (x, y, θ) = y − cd (x, θ) to dealers.
The term cd (x, θ) represents the distribution cost incurred by dealers on advertise-
ment, staffing, repair under warranty, etc. In the case where cd (x, θ) is independent
of θ, dealers have private values. Otherwise they have interdependent values, because,
e.g., compared to high-tastes customers, low-taste customers drive more aggressively
and incur higher repair costs under warranty, or they are less knowledgeable about
cars and demand more education, etc..
Consider first the benchmark case in which the manufacturer owns dealers and
the distribution technology and directly sells cars to customers. To fix ideas, suppose
the manufacturer’s objective function is
∫
(x,y,θ)
π (x, y, θ) dµ+ b (µ) ,
where µ represents the entire allocation of consumption bundles to the varying types
of the customers. The term b captures concerns other than sales profit such as brand
reputation and can in principle depend on the entire µ. The target social choice rule
solves max(x,y):Θ→X×Y
∫
π (x, y, θ) dµ+ b (µ), subject to customers’ incentive compat-
ibility constraints (IC)’s and individual rationality constraints (IR)’s.
In reality, the distribution technology is owned by dealers, whereas the manu-
facturer, constrained by the legal barrier described in Section 1, can regulate only
the product-dimension but not price-dimension of the sold bundles. This, together
with the b term that makes the objectives between the manufacturer and dealers
differ, creates incentive problems. For instance, the manufacturer and dealers may
want to charge different prices for given car models, as high prices help the former
maintain a luxury brand reputation, whereas low prices allow the latter to expand
the customer base. Alternatively, they may wish to sell different varieties of cars,
as the manufacturer can cultivate brand loyalty by serving low-end models to young,
first-time customers, whereas dealers may prefer to sell only high-end models. Hidden
tastes further complicate the issue, causing problems such as adverse selection (and
in Appendix C, monopolistic screening) between dealers and customers.
We thus face a new implementation problem where the manufacturer can only
regulate the product-dimension of the traded bundles between dealers and customers
with hidden tastes. We seek to implement any IC-IR social choice rule using policies
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of form ψ : ∆ (X)→ R. Our solutions do not exploit the exact forms of b, cd and v,
which we modelers do not wish to make judgment about.
The candidate policies defined in Section 2.2 are seen in practice. In particular,
• ψper−unit represents invoice-price schedules that charge different per-unit fees
for different car models, and ψˆper−unit is a special case that makes dealers break
even under the target car-price rule;
• ψˆdistr stipulates that dealers sell the target variety of cars.
We distinguish whether intermediaries have private or interdependent values,
across which the effectiveness of our candidate policies differs. By contrast, we al-
low fully generality in the manufacturer’s objective function, which, in principle, can
depend on the customers’ hidden tastes.
3 Main Results
We formally define private and interdependent values:
Definition 2. Intermediaries have private values if π(x, y, θ) is independent of θ for
all (x, y) ∈ X × Y , and they have interdependent values otherwise.
In words, intermediaries have private values if the profit from serving agents is
independent of the latter’s types, and they have interdependent values otherwise.
Below we examine the effectiveness of our candidate policies in both cases.
3.1 Private Values
Our first theorem demonstrates the effectiveness of ψˆper−unit in the case of private
values:
Theorem 1. Suppose intermediaries have private values. Then under ψˆper−unit,
(i) there exists a sub-game perfect equilibrium that achieves intermediated imple-
mentation, whereby σ∗i = {(xˆ (θ) , yˆ (θ)) : θ ∈ Θ} for i = 1, · · · , I and each agent
of type θ consumes (xˆ (θ) , yˆ (θ)) on the equilibrium path;
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(ii) every sub-game perfect equilibrium achieves intermediated implementation if and
only if no agent is indifferent between his target bundle and any other bundle
prescribed by the target social choice rule.
Part (i) of Theorem 1 prescribes an equilibrium that achieves intermediated im-
plementation. Since ψˆper−unit allows intermediaries to break even under the target
social choice rule, it follows from private values that a consumption good yields a
profit if and only if it is sold above the target level of price. Meanwhile, incentive
compatibility implies that each agent weakly prefers his target bundle to that of other
agents, let alone bundles that are profitable to intermediaries. Thus no intermediary
can make a profit when other intermediaries charge the target levels of prices, and
Part (i) is immediate.
Part (ii) of Theorem 1 shows that all equilibria induced by ψˆper−unit are outcome
equivalent if and only if no agent is indifferent between his target bundle and any other
bundle prescribed by the target social choice rule. Key to the proof is the following
lemma, which shows that all equilibria induced by ψˆper−unit are payoff equivalent in
the following sense:
Lemma 1. Assume private values. Then in every sub-game perfect equilibrium of the
game induced by ψˆper−unit, all sold consumption goods are traded at the target levels
of prices, all agents obtain the target levels of utilities and all intermediaries break
even.
By Lemma 1, if an equilibrium induced by ψˆper−unit fails to achieve intermediated
implementation, then some agent’s target consumption good is not traded on the
equilibrium path. But then this agent must be indifferent in the sense described in
Theorem 1 (ii), because otherwise any intermediary can offer his target consumption
bundle at a slight premium and make a profit by the assumption of private values.
Part (ii) is then immediate.
3.2 Interdependent Values
We now turn to the case of interdependent values. Section 3.2.1 illustrates through a
counterexample that per-unit fee schedules cannot be generally used to achieve inter-
mediated implementation; Section 3.2.2 demonstrates the effectiveness of distribution
regulation in general environments.
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3.2.1 Per-unit Fee Schedule
Example 1. Θ = {θ1, θ2} and π (x, y, θ2) > π (x, y, θ1) for all (x, y), hence intermedi-
aries prefer to serve type θ2 agents than type θ1 agents, other things being equal. Let
(xˆi, yˆi) denote the target consumption bundle of agent θi, i = 1, 2, and suppose that
(ICθ2) is binding and that (ICθ1) is slack. Below we argue that no equilibrium in-
duced by ψˆper−unit achieves intermediated implementation. In Appendix A, we prove
the same negative result for all per-unit fee schedules. The message is clear: no
incentive compatible allocation of the above described form can be attained in any
separating equilibrium of any per-unit fee schedule.7
By assumption,
π (xˆ1, yˆ1, θ2) > ψˆper−unit (xˆ1) = π (xˆ1, yˆ1, θ1) .
Now suppose, to the contrary, that an equilibrium induced by ψˆper−unit achieves
intermediated implementation. Consider a deviation by intermediary i that adds
(xˆ1, yˆ1 − ǫ) to its menu, where ǫ is a small positive number. By assumption, the new
bundle is preferred by both types of agents to their equilibrium bundles. Furthermore,
it increases intermediary i’s profit by a positive amount:
ρπ (xˆ1, yˆ1, θ2) + (1− ρ)π (xˆ1, yˆ1, θ1)− ψˆper−unit (xˆ1)
= ρ [π (xˆ1, yˆ1, θ2)− π (xˆ1, yˆ1, θ1)]
> 0,
where ρ denotes the population of type θ2 agents in the economy. This leads to a
contradiction.
3.2.2 Distribution Regulation
The negative result of the previous section calls for the use of aggregate-level reg-
ulations. In what follows, we first construct an equilibrium of ψˆdistr that achieves
7The material of Appendix B shows that no per-unit fee schedule implements the target allocation
through cross-subsidization. The result doesn’t imply that the games induced by per-unit fee sched-
ules have no equilibrium. Nor does it give full characterizations of implementable outcomes through
per-unit fee schedules. The difference between existing studies on laissez-faire economies with ad-
verse selection is explained in Section 1.1. An earlier draft did more equilibrium characterization,
which now spins off as a separate project, though some material is available upon request.
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intermediated implementation, and then give the sufficient and necessary condition
for every equilibrium of ψˆdistr to achieve intermediated implementation.
A few definitions before we go into detail. The next definition is standard in
implementation theory and should not be confused with Definition 1:
Definition 3. A consumption rule x : Θ → X is implementable if there exists a
transfer rule y : Θ→ Y such that (x, y) : Θ→ X × Y is incentive compatible for all
agents.
Definition 4. A bijection π : Θ → Θ constitutes a cyclic permutation of Θ if θ →
π(θ)→ π ◦ π(θ)→ · · · forms a |Θ|-cycle.
Our main definition says that a consumption rule satisfies (DU) if permuting
consumption goods yields distinct total utilities of consumption among agents:
Definition 5. Permuting a consumption rule x : Θ → X yields a distinct total
utility of consumption among agents (hereinafter, DU) if for any Θ′ ⊂ Θ such that
x(θ) 6= x(θ′) ∀θ, θ′ ∈ Θ′ and any cyclic permutation π : Θ′ → Θ′, we have that
∑
θ∈Θ′
v(x(θ), θ) 6=
∑
θ∈Θ′
v(x(π(θ)), θ). (DU)
Theorem 2. Under ψˆdistr,
(i) there exists a sub-game perfect equilibrium that achieves intermediated imple-
mentation, whereby σ∗i = {(xˆ (θ) , yˆ (θ)) : θ ∈ Θ} for i = 1, · · · , I and each agent
of type θ consumes (xˆ (θ) , yˆ (θ)) on the equilibrium path;
(ii) every sub-game perfect equilibrium achieves intermediated implementation if and
only if xˆ : Θ→ X satisfies (DU).
Below we sketch the proof of Theorem 2. The formal proof is relegated to Ap-
pendix B.
Part (i) Under ψˆdistr, the only way that intermediaries can make profits is to per-
mute the target consumption goods among agents. However, if these deviations are
unprofitable for intermediaries, then in equilibrium, all agents obtain target consump-
tion goods and competition drives prices to target levels.
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Thus the problem boils down to showing that intermediaries cannot profit from
permuting target consumption goods among agents. The next example helps build
intuition:
Example 2. There are two types of agents θ1 and θ2, each obtains a distinct con-
sumption good xˆi, i = 1, 2, under the target social choice rule. Since the target
consumption rule is implementable, it satisfies Rochet’s (1987) cyclic monotonicity:
v (xˆ1, θ1) + v (xˆ2, θ2) ≥ v (xˆ1, θ2) + v (xˆ2, θ1) .
Meanwhile, if permuting target consumption goods among agents yields a new im-
plementable rule, then applying cyclic monotonicity again yields
v (xˆ2, θ1) + v (xˆ1, θ2) ≥ v (xˆ1, θ2) + v (xˆ2, θ1) .
Combining these inequalities shows that if xˆ satisfies (DU), i.e.,
v (xˆ1, θ1) + v (xˆ2, θ2) 6= v (xˆ1, θ2) + v (xˆ2, θ1) ,
then any permutation of xˆ is not implementable and hence cannot be part of any
profitable deviation for intermediaries. Finally, if xˆ violates (DU), then agents must be
indifferent under all implementable rules that comprise xˆ1 and xˆ2. If agents break ties
in favor of their target consumption goods off equilibrium path, then any permutation
of xˆ cannot arise off equilibrium path and hence cannot be part of any profitable
deviation for intermediaries. This proves Part (i).
Part (ii) The “if” direction is immediate. To establish the “only if” direction,
we construct–through exploiting agents’ tie-breaking rules–“bad equilibria” in which
agents swap target consumption goods on the equilibrium path. Contrary to Lemma
1, here we may lose both outcome- and payoff-equivalence, in that all agents’ equilib-
rium utilities differ from the target levels, even under the presumption of Theorem 1
(ii) that ensures outcome equivalence in the case of private values. The counterexam-
ple of Appendix B illustrates this point. The message is clear: what drives outcome
equivalence differs between the cases of private and interdependent values.
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3.3 Discussions
Coarse distribution regulation In practice, the principal may not know or en-
force the exact distribution regulation due to information barriers. Consider the
following coarse distribution regulation:
ψ˜distr (νi) =


ψˆper−unit (νi) if
∥∥∥ νi∫
x∈xˆ(Θ) dνi
− Pˆx
∥∥∥ < ǫ,
+∞ otherwise,
(3.1)
where ‖ · ‖ denotes the sup-norm.
Corollary 1. Suppose agents of the same type behave the same. Then Theorem 2
holds true under ψ˜distr when ǫ is small.
Proof. Take ǫ≪ minθ∈Θ Pθ(θ). Repeating the proof of Theorem 2 step by step gives
the desired result.
(DU) The condition (DU) rules out cycles of agents who are mutually indifferent
between each others’ bundles under all permutations of the target consumption rule,
and it can be easily satisfied in both single- and multi-dimensional environments:
Example 3. If X,Θ ⊂ R and v (x, θ) is supermodular in (x, θ), then any imple-
mentable consumption rule is non-decreasing in the agent’s type (Milgrom and Shannon
(1994)) and hence satisfies (DU).
Example 4. Write Θ = {θ1, · · · , θN} and a consumption rule as (x1, · · · , xN), where
xi is the consumption good of agent θi. Let V be the m := N ×N matrix whose ij
th
entry is the utility v (xi, θj) that agent θj earns from consuming xi. Let I denote the
diagonal matrix and Π a typical permutation matrix, both of size m.
By Rochet (1987), the utility matrices that can be attained under incentive com-
patible allocations form a finite intersection of the subspaces of Rm:
⋂
Π 6=I
{V : (I−Π) · V ≥ 0} .
By definition, the utility matrices ruled out by (DU) belong to a finite union of the
half-spaces of Rm: ⋃
Π 6=I
{V : (I−Π) · V = 0} .
The second set is negligible compared to the first one.
4 Other Applications
4.1 Market-based Healthcare Regulation
Now the principal is the government, agents are patients and intermediaries are in-
surance companies. A patient’s endowment is a finite random variable which equals
es with probability θs, s = 1, · · · , S. The probability vector θ = (θ1, · · · , θS) captures
the patient’s risk type and is his private information. The realization of endowment
is public information.
An insurance policy (x, y) is a pair of consumption plan x = (x1, · · · , xS) ∈ X ⊂
R
S and premium y ∈ Y ⊂ R. It yields an expected utility u (x, y, θ) =
∑
s θsv (xs − y)
to type θ patients as well as a profit π (x, y, θ) = y −
∑
s θs (xs − es) to insurance
companies. Each patient can purchase at most one policy. Insurance companies have
interdependent values, as sales profits depend directly on patients’ risk types.
Let (xˆ, yˆ) be any IC-IR social choice rule that the government wishes to imple-
ment. Under single-payer systems, the government directly provides insurance to
patients and the implementation problem she faces is standard. Under market-based
systems, insurance policies are traded between private companies and patients, and
many governmental policies are designed purposefully to partially regulate the sold
policies. An example is coverage-plan subsidy, which regulates the consumption plan
x but not the premium y.
We examine the usefulness of coverage-plan regulations in achieving intermediated
implementation, and our candidate policies are seen in practice. In particular,
• ψper−unit represents per-unit coverage-plan subsidies;
• ψˆdistr enforces the target distribution among sold coverage plans. It resembles
recent rulings introduced by the Affordable Care Act to battle cream skim-
ming, which mandate that all participating companies in the health insurance
exchange sell a variety of coverage plans and penalize companies for selling too
many low coverage plans (Folger (2013); Cox et al. (2016)).
From the material of Section 3.2.2, we know that ψper−unit cannot be generally
used to achieve the target insurance provision. The next proposition justifies the use
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of ψˆdistr when patients have CARA utilities:
Corollary 2. Suppose v (c) = 1− exp (−λc) for some λ > 0. Then under ψˆdistr,
(i) there exists a sub-game perfect equilibrium that achieves intermediated imple-
mentation;
(ii) every sub-game perfect equilibrium achieves intermediated implementation if and
only if xˆ : Θ→ X satisfies (DU) in a quasi-linear economy where agent utilities
are given by −λ−1 log
(∑S
s=1 θs exp (−λxs)
)
− y.
Proof. Rewrite (ICθ) as v˜ (x (θ) , θ) − y (θ) ≥ v˜ (x (θ
′) , θ) − y (θ′), where v˜ (x, θ) :=
−λ−1 log
(∑S
s=1 θs exp (−λxs)
)
. Plugging this into the proof of Theorem 2 gives the
desired result.
4.2 Income Redistribution through Decentralized Employ-
ment Contracting
Now the principal is the government, agents are workers, and intermediaries are firms.
Each worker privately knows his innate ability θ and can work for at most one firm.
An employment contract (x, y) specifies an after-tax consumption x ∈ X ⊂ R and a
required level of performance y ∈ Y ⊂ R. It yields a utility u (x, y, θ) = x − v (y, θ)
to type θ workers and a profit π(x, y, θ) = h (y, θ)− x to firms.
Whether firms have private or interdependent values hinges on the contracting
technology. Two cases have been examined by the existing literature. In the case
where y represents the effective labor output as in Mirrlees (1971), h (y, θ) = y and
firms have private values. In the case where y represents labor hours as in Stantcheva
(2014), h (y, θ) depends directly on θ and firms have interdependent values.
Mirrlees (1971) assumes that the government owns the contracting technology
whereas firms are passive entities. The government wishes to achieve a redistributive
goal, subject to workers’ IC-IR constraints, as well as a feasibility constraint that
lower bounds the tax revenue.8 The solution to this problem, denoted by (xˆ, yˆ), is
referred to as the constrained efficient allocation by the public finance literature. To
implement this allocation, the government proposes the menu {(xˆ (θ) , yˆ (θ)) : θ ∈ Θ}
8To be precise, Mirrlees (1971) ignores the issue of decentralization and hence workers’ individual
rationality constraints. Adding these constraints into the problem affects the target social choice
rule but not the effectiveness of our implementation strategies.
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of target employment contracts to workers and let them self-select; post production,
workers consume xˆ (θ) and the government retains πˆ (xˆ (θ)).
In Mirrlees (1971), the government contracts directly with workers and monitors
the latter’s performances. In today’s market economies, these roles are typically
assumed by firms, whose performance evaluation methods often utilize hard-to-verify
or even subjective information (Levin (2003)). The government thus faces the same
partial control problem as in the leading example. On the one hand, she cannot dictate
the employment contracts signed between firms and workers. Even if she could, it
would be difficult to verify workers’ performances or to infer them from noisy public
records such as firms’ profits. On the other hand, it is much easier to regulate wages.
By law, firms are required to report wage payments to the government.
We introduce the above described friction into Mirrlees (1971)’s setting and limit
the government to using wage regulations ψ : ∆ (X) → R. The candidate policies
defined in Section 2.2 are seen in practice. In particular,
• per-unit fee schedules–which charge a fee t(x) for each level x of net consumption–
represent non-linear income tax schedules; Mirrlees’ income tax schedule coin-
cides with ψˆper−unit and makes firms break even under the target social choice
rule;
• ψdistr enforces the target wage distribution among employees. It resembles the
employment target faced by federal employers, which mandates that a certain
percentage of their low-wage positions be filled with people with self-reported
disabilities. Hidden disabilities protected by The Americans with Disabilities
Act (ADA) include attention deficit-disorder, diabetes, HIV/AIDS, etc.. The
Executive Order 13548 signed by President Obama requires that federal agencies
reach hiring and retention targets for employees with self-reported disabilities.
From Theorems 1 and 2, we know that Mirrlees’ income tax schedule attains
constrained efficiency if parties can contract directly on effective labor outputs. If
they can contract only on labor hours, then income tax schedules cannot be generally
used to achieve the redistribution goal, whereas policies that enforce the target wage
distribution among workers restore the effectiveness thereof. The second prediction
differs from that of Stantcheva (2014), and the difference is reviewed in Section 1.1.
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5 Concluding Remarks
We conclude with discussions of maintained assumptions and directions of future re-
search. So far, the assumption of quasi-linearity has enabled us to invoke Rochet
(1987)’s characterization of implementable consumption rules by cyclic monotonicity,
whereas that of finite types has helped us avoid dealing infinite cycles in the proof.
These assumptions can be relaxed to different extents, depending on whether inter-
mediaries have private or interdependent values. In particular, the proof of Theorem
1 (i) requires only that the function u (x, y, θ) be decreasing y and no assumption
about the type space. Corollary 2 extends Theorem 2 to CARA utility functions in
the application to insurance sales.
The restriction on the principal’s policy space directly translates the implemen-
tation friction in practice into math. The policy induces a game between multiple
intermediaries and agents, who have so far been limited to interacting through direct
revelation mechanisms. What would happen if players can use competing mechanisms
and communicate more information than agents’ payoff types?
The following answers are partial and yet noteworthy. First, our result on partial
implementation–i.e., Part (i) of Theorems 1 and 2–remains valid. Thus from the
principal’s perspective, the best achievable outcome through consumption regulation
coincides with the target social choice rule.
Second, assume (DU) and fix ψˆdistr—the strongest policy of our kind. Since the
equilibrium assignment of bundles to agents must be incentive compatible, the exact
same proof of Theorem 2 implies that every agent must obtain his target consump-
tion good in any equilibrium induced by any competing mechanism. In Theorem 2
(i), intermediaries compete on the price dimension a` la Bertrand. By enriching the
message space, they can sustain more collusive price levels, with the most collusive
one solving:
max
(x,y):Θ→X×Y
∫
(x,y,θ)
π (x, y, θ) dµ
s.t. (ICθ), (IRθ), x (θ) = xˆ (θ) ∀θ.
So far we have considered competitive intermediaries and two extreme policies, rel-
egating the analysis of monopolistic intermediary to Appendix C. The bundles offered
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by the differing intermediaries are perfect substitutes, produced through a technol-
ogy that has constant returns to scale. We relaxed the last assumption in an earlier
draft, and the material is available upon request. In the future, we plan to exam-
ine more intermediate cases and in particular, to characterize the second-best policy
in restrictive environments where the exact conditions for achieving intermediated
implementation fails to hold.
A Omitted Materials from Section 3.1
Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. Take any equilibrium induced by ψˆper−unit. Denote the set of bundles sold to a
positive measure of agents by A, those sold by intermediary i by Ai, and the measure
of agents who purchase bundles from set S ⊂ A by µ (S).
Notice first that no element of A incurs a loss. Below we demonstrate that every
element of A must yield zero profit. If the contrary were true, then let (x, y) be the
most profitable element of A. Such bundle exists, because on the equilibrium path,
every sold consumption good to a positive measure of agents must belong to xˆ (Θ),
hence A is a finite set.
Consider two case:
Case 1 (x, y) /∈ Ai for some i. In this case, consider a deviation by intermediary i
that adds (x, y − ǫ) to its menu, where ǫ is a positive number. This deviation has
two effects: (1) all agents who used to purchase (x, y) now obtain (x, y − ǫ) from
intermediary i; (2) some agents who used to purchase different bundles than
(x, y) now obtain (x, y − ǫ) from i. When ǫ is small, (2) increases i’s payoff. The
net change in i’s payoff is bounded below by µ ({(x, y)}) · [π (x, y − ǫ)− πˆ (x)] >
0, and this leads to a contradiction.
Case 2 x ∈ Ai for all i = 1, · · · , I. In this case, consider a deviation by any inter-
mediary j that adds (x, y − ǫ) to its menu. Everything is as above, except that
agents who used to purchase (x, y) from j now pay a lower price. The net loss
is of O (ǫ) and is negligible when ǫ is small.
We next demonstrate that all agents must obtain the target levels of utilities.
From the above argument, it follows that if the equilibrium utility of any agent type
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θ falls short of the target level, then xˆ (θ) is not traded on the equilibrium path. But
then any intermediary can add (xˆ (θ) , yˆ (θ) + ǫ) to its menu and make a profit when
ǫ is small, and this leads to a contradiction.
Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. Part (i): Let σ∗j = {(xˆ (θ) , yˆ (θ)) : θ ∈ Θ} for all j 6= i as in Theorem 1.
Suppose, to the contrary, there exists (xˆ (θ′) , y) ∈ σ∗i such that (1) u (xˆ (θ
′) , y, θ) ≥
u (xˆ (θ) , yˆ (θ) , θ) for some θ, (2) π (xˆ (θ′) , y) ≥ πˆ (xˆ (θ′)) := π (xˆ (θ′) , yˆ (θ′)), and
(3) one of these inequalities is strict. Assume w.l.o.g. that it is u (xˆ (θ′) , y, θ) >
u (xˆ (θ) , yˆ (θ) , θ).
By incentive compatibility, we have u (xˆ(θ), yˆ(θ), θ) ≥ u (xˆ (θ′) , yˆ (θ′) , θ) and
hence u (xˆ (θ′) , y, θ) > u (xˆ (θ′) , yˆ (θ′) , θ). Since u is decreasing in y and π is in-
creasing in y, it follows that y < yˆ (θ′) and hence that πˆ (xˆ (θ′)) := π (xˆ (θ′) , yˆ (θ′)) ≤
π (xˆ (θ′) , y) < π (xˆ (θ′) , yˆ (θ′)) := πˆ (xˆ (θ′)), a contradiction.
Part (ii): From Lemma 1, it follows that if an equilibrium induced by ψˆper−unit fails
to achieve intermediated implementation, then the target consumption good xˆ (θ)
of some agent type θ is not traded on the equilibrium path. But then type θ agents
must be indifferent between (xˆ (θ) , yˆ (θ)) and another bundle prescribed by the target
social choice rule, otherwise any intermediary can add (xˆ (θ) , yˆ (θ) + ǫ) to its menu
and make a profit by private values when ǫ is small but positive, a contradiction.
B Omitted Materials from Section 3.2
Completing Example 1
Proof. Fix any different per-unit fee schedule than ψˆper−unit. From the discussion in
Section 3.2.1, it follows that in any equilibrium that achieves intermediated imple-
mentation, intermediaries must (1) incur a loss from serving a bundle b prescribed
by the target social choice rule to its target agents, (2) make a profit from serving
another bundle b′ prescribed by the target social choice rule to its target agents, and
(3) break even on average. Consider two cases:
Case 1 b = (xˆ1, yˆ1) and b
′ = (xˆ2, yˆ2). Take any intermediary i who serves b to type θ1
agents and notice the following contradiction. On the one hand, if i is the only
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intermediary serving b to type θ1 agents, then any other active intermediary
must be serving b′ to type θ2 agents and making a profit, hence i can make
a profit, too, by offering (xˆ2, yˆ2 − ǫ) to type θ2 agents. On the other hand, if
another intermediary j 6= i is serving b to type θ1 agents, too, then i can drop
b from its menu and save the loss.
Case 2 b = (xˆ2, yˆ2) and b
′ = (xˆ1, yˆ1). Take any intermediary i who serves b to type θ2
agents and notice the following contradiction. On the one hand, if i is the only
intermediary serving b to type θ2 agents, then any other active intermediary
must be serving b′ to type θ1 agents and making a profit, hence i can make a
profit, too, by offering (xˆ1, yˆ1 − ǫ) to both types of agents. On the other hand,
if another intermediary j 6= i is serving b to type θ2 agents, too, then i can drop
b from its menu and save the loss.
Lemma 2. Let x : Θ→ X be an implementable consumption rule that satisfies (DU).
Then for any Θ′ ⊂ Θ such that x (θ) 6= x (θ′) ∀θ, θ′ ∈ Θ′ and any cyclic permutation
π of Θ′, x ◦ π : Θ′ → X is not implementable among agents in Θ′.
Proof. Write Θ′ = {θ1, · · · , θm} and x (θi) = xi for i = 1, · · · , m. By assumption,
there exists a transfer rule y : Θ′ → R such that
v (x2, θ1)− y2 ≤ v (x1, θ1)− y1,
v (x3, θ2)− y3 ≤ v (x2, θ2)− y2,
· · ·
v (x1, θm)− y1 ≤ v (xm, θm)− ym.
Summing over these inequalities yields
∑m
i=1 v (xi+1, θi) ≤
∑m
i=1 v (xi, θi). Meanwhile,
if (x2, · · · , xm, x1) is implementable among (θ1, · · · , θm), then there exists a transfer
rule y′ : Θ′ → R such that
v (x2, θ1)− y
′
2 ≥ v (x1, θ1)− y
′
1,
v (x3, θ2)− y
′
3 ≥ v (x2, θ2)− y
′
2,
· · ·
v (x1, θm)− y
′
1 ≥ v (xm, θm)− y
′
m.
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Summing over these inequalities yields
∑m
i=1 v (xi+1, θi) ≥
∑m
i=1 v (xi, θi). Thus, a
sufficient condition for (x2, · · · , xm, x1) to be not implementable among (θ1, · · · , θm)
is
∑m
i=1 v (xi+1, θi) 6=
∑m
i=1 v (xi, θi). Repeating the above argument for all Θ
′ ⊂ Θ
and all cyclic permutations of Θ′ gives the desired result.
Proof of Theorem 2 (i)
Proof. Take any strategy profile
(
σi, σ
∗
−i
)
where σ∗j = {(xˆ (θ) , yˆ (θ)) : θ ∈ Θ} for all
j 6= i. Let xj : Θ→ X be the consumption correspondence induced by intermediary
j’s sold bundles. For any x, x′ ∈ xˆ (Θ) such that xˆ (θ) = x and x′ ∈ xj (θ) for some
θ and j, we say that x (resp. x′) is an immediate predecessor (resp. immediate
successor) of x′ (resp. x), and write x → x′. Let yj (x) denote the price charged by
intermediary j for x ∈ xˆ (Θ). By assumption, yj (x) = yˆ (x) for all j 6= i, where yˆ (x)
is the unique price y ∈ Y such that (x, y) ∈ (xˆ, yˆ) (Θ).
Consider the graph generated by
(
σi, σ
∗
−i
)
. For each x ∈ xi (Θ), only three situa-
tions can happen: (1) x has no immediate predecessor or successor, (2) x is part of a
cycle, and (3) x is part of a chain. Below we go through these cases one by one:
Case 1 In this case, we must have yi (x) = yˆ (x), as the remaining possibilities can
be ruled out as follows:
• If yi (x) > yˆ (x), then no agent will purchase x from i, a contradiction.
• If yi (x) < yˆ (x), then all agents with target consumption good x will purchase x
from i. In order to satisfy the distribution requirement, i must charge yi (x′) ≤
yˆ (x′) for all other x′ ∈ xˆ (Θ) and incur a loss, a contradiction.
Case 2 This case is ruled out either by (DU) or by agents’ tie-breaking rules off
equilibrium path. Specifically, for any cycle x → x′ → · · · , let θ, θ′, · · · be any
sequence of agents that consumes (i) x, x′, · · · under the target social choice rule,
and (ii) x′, x′′, · · · now:
• If xˆ : Θ → X satisfies (DU), then the new consumption rule that assigns x′
to θ, x′′ to θ′, so on and so forth, cannot be part of any incentive compatible
allocation, let alone being the result of intermediary i’s profitable deviation.
25
• If xˆ : Θ→ X violates (DU), then the inequalities in the proof of Lemma 2 are
all binding, and hence θ is indifferent between x and x′, θ′ is indifferent between
x′ and x′′, so on and so forth, under any incentive compatible allocation. Off
equilibrium path, if agents break ties in favor of their target consumption goods,
then the cycle x→ x′ → · · · cannot arise in the first place, let alone being the
result of intermediary i’s profitable deviation.
Case 3 This case is impossible, too. Take any chain with end node x′ := xˆ (θ′) and
let x′′ := xˆ (θ′′) be an immediate predecessor of x′. Notice three things:
1. Incentive compatibility implies that v (x′′, θ′′)− yˆ (x′′) ≥ v (x′, θ′′)− yˆ (x′).
2. x′′ → x′ implies that v (x′′, θ′′)− yˆ (x′′) ≤ v (x′, θ′′)− yi (x′).
3. The definition of end node means that type θ′ agents consume x′.
Combining these observations yields yi (x′) = yˆ (x′), as the remaining possibilities can
be ruled out as follows:
• If yi (x′) > yˆ (x′), then v (x′, θ′′)−yi (x′) < v (x′, θ′′)− yˆ (x′) ≤ v (x′′, θ′′)− yˆ (x′′)
and hence type θ′′ agents will not purchase (x′, yi (x′)), a contradiction.
• If yi (x′) < yˆ (x′), then the very fact that x′ is an end node implies that type
θ′ agents obtain x′ from intermediary i. This observation, together with the
assumption that x′′ → x′, implies that i violates the distribution requirement,
a contradiction.
Combining Cases 1-3 yields yi (x) = yˆ (x) for all x ∈ xi (Θ), and this completes
the proof.
Proof of Theorem 2 (ii)
Proof. “If” direction Let xi denote the consumption correspondence induced by
intermediary i’s sold bundles. In any equilibrium, we must have ∪Ii=1x
i (Θ) = xˆ (Θ),
because otherwise either some intermediary is violating the distribution requirement
or all intermediaries are inactive, a contradiction.
Take the graph generated by agents’ consumption choices. Clearly, this graph
contains no cycle because of (DU), and it contains no chain because otherwise some
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intermediary violates the distribution requirement and would prefer to exit the market
instead. Thus the bundle consumed by each type θ agent is of form (xˆ (θ) , y (θ)), and
the competition between intermediaries drives y (θ) to yˆ (θ) for all θ.
“Only if” direction Let Θ′ denote a typical subset of Θ whereby (1) xˆ(θ) 6= xˆ(θ′) for
all θ, θ′ ∈ Θ′ and (2)
∑
θ∈Θ′ v(xˆ(θ), θ) =
∑
θ∈Θ′ v(xˆ(π(θ)), θ) for some cyclic permu-
tation π : Θ′ → Θ′. Henceforth we shall call Θ′ an indifference cycle. By definition,
(i) xˆ violates (DU) if and only if indifference cycle exists, and (ii) any implementable
consumption correspondence that differs from the target consumption rule and satis-
fies the distribution requirement can be obtained from permuting target consumption
goods along indifference cycles.
Take any such consumption correspondence and let intermediaries compete profits
to zero. To sustain this outcome in an equilibrium, suppose that agents adopt the
same tie-breaking rule on and off equilibrium path. Then from point (ii) of the last
paragraph, it follows that off equilibrium path, agents must obtain the same consump-
tion goods as they do on the equilibrium path in order for the deviating intermediary
to meet the distribution requirement. But then the deviation is unprofitable, because
profit has already been competed to zero on the equilibrium path.
Payoff and outcome disparities
Example 2 (Continued). Suppose π (x, y, θ) = y − c (x, θ), xˆ violates (DU) and
each agent type constitutes half the agent population. To ease exposition, write
vij = v (xˆi, θj) and cij = c (xˆi, θj) for i, j = 1, 2, and normalize π (xˆi, yˆi, θi) to zero for
i = 1, 2.
Take any outcome that assigns (xˆ2, y2) to type θ1 agents and (xˆ1, y1) to type θ2
agents. To sustain this outcome in equilibrium, we must satisfy agents’ incentive
compatibility constraints and intermediaries’ zero-profit condition:


y1 − y2 = v12 − v22 = v11 − v21,
y1 + y2 = c12 + c21.
Denote the solution to this system of equations by (y∗1, y
∗
2).
Now suppose an intermediary unilaterally deviates from the above outcome. In
order to make a profit, the deviator must offer (xˆ1, y
′
1) to type θ1 agents and (xˆ2, y
′
2)
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to type θ2 agents such that


y′1 − y
′
2 = v12 − v22 = v11 − v21,
y′1 + y
′
2 ≥ c11 + c22.
When c11 + c22 ≫ c21 + c12–which can only happen under interdependent values–
each agent of type θi strictly prefers
(
xˆ−i, y
∗
−i
)
to all bundles of form (xˆi, y
′
i), where
(y′1, y
′
2) satisfies the second system of inequalities. Thus the deviation is unprofitable,
and the above described outcome can be attained in an equilibrium. The result on
payoff disparity is immediate, and it can be made consistent with the presumption of
Theorem 1 (ii), namely vjj + yˆj 6= vij + yˆi, i, j = 1, 2.
C Monopolistic Intermediary
In this appendix, suppose I = 1, Θ =
[
θ, θ
]
⊂ R and X ⊂ R. The distribution of
agent types has a positive density function on Θ. The function v (x, θ) satisfies the
single-crossing property, and vθ (x, θ) exists and is uniformly bounded.
In general, we cannot use per-unit fee schedules to achieve intermediated imple-
mentation. The reason is monopolistic screening, namely the monopolistic interme-
diary will distort the allocation among agents and extract information rents.
Instead, take any q ∈ [0, 1], and let νx and νy denote the distributions on X and Y
that are induced by the sold consumption bundles. Consider the following generalized
distribution regulation, which charges ψˆper−unit if (1) the intermediary enforces the
target distribution on consumption goods, and if (2) the 100qth percentile of the
charged prices, denoted by q (νy), is capped above by its counterpart q
(
Pˆy
)
under
the target social choice:
ψ˘distr (νx, q (µy)) =


ψˆper−unit (νx) if νx = Pˆx and q (νy) ≤ q
(
Pˆy
)
,
+∞ otherwise.
Theorem 3. σ∗ = {(xˆ (θ) , yˆ (θ)) : θ ∈ Θ} under ψ˘distr.
Proof. Write σ∗ = {(x∗ (θ) , y∗ (θ)) : θ ∈ Θ}. By Milgrom and Shannon (1994), any
implementable consumption rule is non-decreasing in the agent’s type, so the require-
ment µx = Pˆx limits the intermediary to offering x
∗ = xˆ. Then from the envelope
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theorem (Milgrom and Segal (2002)), it follows that
y˜ (θ) = v (xˆ (θ) , θ)−
∫ θ
θ
vθ (xˆ (s) , s) ds+ constant
for y˜ = yˆ and y∗. To maximize profit, subject to requirement that q (νy) ≤ q
(
Pˆy
)
,
the intermediary sets y∗ = yˆ.
Theorem 3 shows that regulating the variety of sold consumption goods, together
with a price cap, induces the monopolistic intermediary to offer the full menu of
target consumption bundles. Besides the aforementioned applications, this result
explains why housing authorities impose rigid rulings on major real-estate companies
regarding the mixture of the housing types that can be developed for low-income
households. It suggests that one way to stop schools from oversubscribing students
into the National School Lunch Program is to limit the percentage of eligible students
based on the income distribution within the school district.
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